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  Economists, beginning with Alfred Marshall, have studied the significance of cities in the 
production and exploitation of information externalities that, today, we call knowledge 
spillovers. This paper presents robust evidence of those effects. We show that patent intensity—
the per capita invention rate—is positively related to the density of employment in the highly 
urbanized portion of MAs. All else equal, a city with twice the employment density (jobs per 
square mile) of another city will exhibit a patent intensity (patents per capita) that is 20 percent 
higher. Patent intensity is maximized at an employment density of about 2,200 jobs per square 
mile. A city with a more competitive market structure or one that is not too large (a population 
less than 1 million) will also have a higher patent intensity. These findings confirm the widely 
held view that the nation’s densest locations play an important role in creating the flow of ideas 
that generate innovation and growth.   
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1.  Introduction 
  With the emergence of endogenous growth theory in the 1980s, externalities associated 
with knowledge spillovers have played a prominent role in thinking about sustained economic 
growth of nations (Romer [44], Lucas [35] and Porter [42]). Lucas [35] argues that these 
externalities are most likely manifested in cities since their dense concentration of people and 
jobs is best suited to exploit them.   
  To date, economists have provided limited, but tantalizing, evidence on the existence and 
importance of these spillovers. Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson [31] find that nearby inventors 
have a much higher propensity to cite each others’ patents, suggesting that knowledge spillovers 
are indeed localized. But their study does not explain how city characteristics, such as size and 
local density, influence the production of these spillovers. Several authors find that patent 
activity increases with metropolitan area size (Feldman and Audretsch [21] and O hUallachain 
[41]). But these studies do not control for inputs into the innovation process, such as R&D, and 
therefore cannot identify the external effects. 
  Ciccone and Hall [17] look at the relation between county employment density and 
productivity at the state level. They find that a doubling of employment density in a county 
results in about a 6 percent increase of average labor productivity. But why is density important 
for productivity? We show that density is important in explaining innovative output, and this 
may explain the pattern in productivity found by Ciccone and Hall [17].    
  In this paper, we explicitly examine the effects of employment density (jobs per square 
mile), city size (total employment), and other characteristics on the rate of innovation across 
metropolitan areas in the U.S. We use the average rate of patenting per capita—what we call 
patent intensity—in a metropolitan area as a measure of innovative productivity in these areas. 
We find a statistically significant relationship between patent intensity and employment density  
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in the highly urbanized portion of metropolitan areas. All else equal, patent intensity is about 20 
percent higher in a metropolitan area with employment density that is twice that of another 
metropolitan area. Since employment density doubles almost four times in our data set, the 
implied gains in patent intensity are substantial.  
Additionally, we have assembled a very rich data set, which permits us to test a number 
of related hypotheses. For example, based on the criterion of maximizing patent intensity, we 
find evidence of an optimal city size—about the size of Austin, TX, and optimal employment 
density—about the density of Baltimore or Philadelphia. We find that cities with a more 
competitive local market structure generate more patents per capita. We also find that our main 
results are not sensitive to the measure of employment density used—we obtain similar 
coefficients using all jobs or just certain categories of jobs most likely to consist of knowledge 
workers. 
2. The literature  
  Much of the theoretical literature on urban agglomeration economies has focused on 
externalities in the production of goods and services rather than invention itself. Nevertheless, 
the three mechanisms primarily explored in this literature are also relevant for the invention of 
new goods and services: input sharing, matching, and knowledge spillovers.
1 The first of these 
points to the sharing of indivisible factors of production, or the benefits of increased variety of 
differentiated inputs, that occurs in areas with a large number of final-goods producers (e.g., 
Helsely and Strange [28]).  For example, Ciccone and Hall [17] show how density can give rise 
to increasing returns in production due to the greater variety of intermediate products available in 
                                                 
1 These themes are developed in the excellent survey by Duranton and Puga [19]. Recent surveys of the empirical 
literature on agglomeration economies include Eberts and McMillen [20] and Rosenthal and Strange [45].  
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denser locations. They argue the positive correlation between employment density and 
productivity implies that agglomeration economies dominate the congestion effects.
2  
  A second theory argues that denser urban agglomerations improve the quality of matches 
among firms and workers. Models of this sort include Wheeler [57], Helsley and Strange [27] 
and Berliant, Reed, and Wang [11].
3  In the latter, workers in dense locations are more selective 
in their matches because the opportunity cost of waiting for a prospective partner is lower. That 
is because, even though agents are more selective, on average they form matches more quickly. 
As a result, the average output from matches is higher, and a higher share of the work force is 
engaged in productive matches.   
  The third strand of theory argues that the geographic concentration of people and jobs in 
cities facilitates the spread of tacit knowledge. While the exact mechanism is not well identified 
in theory, the underlying idea articulated in Marshall [36] is that the geographic proximity 
created by density facilitates the exchange of information among workers and firms. There does 
appear to be some empirical evidence in favor of this view.
4 But there can be too much density in 
the sense that it may be harder to maintain trade secrets in more dense locations. This potential 
for poaching may force firms to rely on patenting to a greater extent in dense areas.   
While a full review of the empirical literature on the geographic extent of knowledge 
spillovers is beyond the scope of this paper, we will touch on a few relevant papers.
5 Rosenthal 
and Strange [46] consider the importance of input sharing, matching, and knowledge spillovers 
                                                 
2 See also Sedgley and Elmslie [48]. 
3 Similar testable implications can also be derived from Jovanovic and Rob [33], if one assumes either the meeting 
rate or their imitation parameter (m) is increasing in the density of workers. 
4 See, for example, the interactions of semiconductor engineers in Silicon Valley as described in Saxenian [47]. 
5 See Audretsch and Feldman [9] for a review of the literature on the geography of knowledge spillovers.    
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for manufacturing firms at the state, county, and zip code levels of geography. They find the 
effects of knowledge spillovers on agglomeration of manufacturing firms tend to be quite 
localized, influencing agglomeration only at the zip code level.
6   
Andersson, Burgess, and Lane [2] show that the correlation between workers’ skills 
(education) and employers’ productivity (revenue per worker) at the establishment level is larger 
in counties with higher population densities. They argue that this is evidence of superior 
matching between workers and firms in more dense labor markets. Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and 
Henderson [31], mentioned earlier, find that a new patent is five to 10 times more likely to cite 
earlier patents from the same city than one would expect based on a control group of other 
patents. Arzaghi and Henderson [8] find the density of advertising agencies in New York City 
contributes to information spillovers that enhance productivity. Jaffe [32], Audretsch and 
Feldman [10], and Anselin, Varga, and Acs [4] found evidence of localized knowledge spillovers 
from university R&D to commercial innovation by private firms, even after controlling for the 
location of industrial R&D. Many of these studies find that these externalities tend to be highly 
localized even within a given metropolitan area.  
Following Glaeser, et al. [24], much empirical research has focused on the effects of an 
economy’s industrial structure on innovation and growth. Feldman and Audretsch [21], using 
data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Innovation Data Base, found evidence 
supporting the industrial diversity thesis of Jacobs [30]. Glaeser, et al. [24] studied employment 
growth between 1956 and 1987 across specific industries within cities. They also found that 
more industrially diversified metropolitan areas grew more rapidly.   
                                                 
6 Several other studies find that knowledge spillovers dissipate rapidly with distance. See, for example, Arzaghi and 
Henderson [8], Audretsch and Feldman [10]), and Keller [34].  
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In contrast, Henderson, Kuncoro, and Turner [29] examined employment growth rates 
between 1970 and 1987 in eight manufacturing industries located in 224 cities. For five 
traditional capital goods industries they found that employment growth in these sectors was 
positively correlated with a high past concentration in the same industry, supporting the 
industrial concentration, or Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) view. They found evidence of both 
MAR and Jacobs externalities for new high-tech industries.  
Economists debate the effects of an area’s market structure on the rate of innovation and 
growth. Chinitz [16] and Jacobs [30] argued that the rate of innovations is greater in cities with 
competitive market structures. Glaeser, et al. [24] argue that the MAR view implies that local 
monopoly may foster innovation because firms in such environments have fewer neighbors who 
imitate them. The empirical literature tends to favors the Chinitz and Jacobs view over the MAR 
view. Feldman and Audretsch [21] find that local competition is more conducive to innovative 
activity than is local monopoly. Glaeser, et al.[24] find that local competition is more conducive 
to city growth than is local monopoly. 
3. Our data and regression strategy 
Since data on innovations are not generally available at the local level, we use patents per 
capita, what we call patent intensity, in a metropolitan area as our measure of innovative 
productivity. This measure has its shortcomings, since some innovations are not patented and 
patents differ enormously in their economic impact.
7 Nonetheless, patents remain a useful 
measure of the generation of ideas. 
We regress patent intensity in a metropolitan area on measures of local employment 
density, city size, and a variety of control variables. More specifically, the dependent variable in 
                                                 
7 For a general discussion on the use of patents as indicators, see Griliches [25].  
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our regressions is the log of patents per capita averaged over the period 1990-99.
8 We use an 
average over the 1990s to minimize any effects of year-to-year fluctuations in patent intensity, 
which could be an issue in smaller metropolitan areas. To mitigate any bias induced by 
endogeneity or reverse causation, the independent variables are at 1989-90, or roughly 
beginning-of-the-period values. In section 6.2, we investigate these potential biases more closely 
and find little, if any, effect on our results. Before presenting the exact specification, we will 
describe the variables used in our regressions.   
  The sample consists of 280 metropolitan areas as defined in 1983. For brevity, we refer to 
these as MAs. Included in this sample are 264 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and primary 
metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs). To include as many patents as possible in our data set, 
we group 25 component PMSAs into their corresponding nine consolidated metropolitan 
statistical areas (CMSAs). We also group 21 separate MSAs into seven metropolitan areas.
9 This 
aggregation permits us to include an additional 9,000 patents (6.5 percent of the total) in our 
regressions. Our main results are not affected if we drop these observations.  
3.1 The patent data  
  Patents are assigned to metropolitan areas according to the residential address of the first 
inventor named on the patent.
10 We allocate patents to a county or metropolitan area when we 
can identify a match to a unique county or metropolitan area. Patents that cannot be uniquely 
matched are excluded from our data set. We can locate over 581,000 patents granted over the 
1990-99 period to inventors living in the U.S. to either a unique county or MA, a match rate of 
96 percent. Just over 534,000 (92 percent) of these patents are associated with an urban county.  
                                                 
8 For details on the construction of all our variables, see the Appendix. 
9 See section A.2 of the Appendix for a list of MSAs that were combined. 
10 In section 6. 1 we verify that our results are not sensitive to the choice of the first inventor’s address.   
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3.2 Land area  
  By definition, employment density is the number of jobs per square mile of land area. 
Employment density varies enormously within metropolitan areas. It is typically highest in the 
central business district (CBD) of an MA’s central city and generally falls off as we move away 
from the CBD. But the vast majority of the land in MSA counties is in fact rural in nature, and 
there is also considerable variation in the degree to which the counties surrounding a central city 
are built out. For example, in the 1990 census only 12 percent of the 580,000 square miles of 
land in MSA counties was categorized as urban in nature. The urban share of MSA land area 
varied from less than 1 percent in Yuma, AZ to 65 percent in Stamford, CT. 
We use a measure of land area that reflects the interaction of workers in labor markets 
that are sufficiently dense to call urban—the urbanized area (UA) of cities.
11 These are defined 
as continuously built-up areas with a population of 50,000 or more, comprising at least one place 
and the adjacent densely settled surrounding area with a population density of at least 1,000 per 
square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, [54]). While UAs often cross county lines, we collected data 
on urbanized area land in each county and then aggregated this number to the MA level. 
3.3 Employment and density 
 For our purposes, the ideal measure of jobs and employment density would count only 
those jobs located in the urbanized area of cities. Unfortunately, such data are generally 
unavailable. For example, our preferred measure of employment is derived from the BLS survey 
of payrolls. We also use these data in our measures of MA size and industrial composition.
12 The 
primary advantage of these data is that jobs are reported based on the place of work rather than 
                                                 
11 Mills and Hamilton [38] (p. 6) argue that urbanized areas correspond to the economist’s notion of urban areas. 
12 All industry breakdowns in this paper are based on the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification system.  
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the place of residence. The disadvantage is that the data are reported at the county or MSA level, 
but not for urbanized areas.  
The Census Bureau reported a measure of employment in UAs in the 1990 census, but 
this count is based on a worker’s place of residence, not his or her place of work. Most workers 
live and work in the same UA, but a significant share of UA employment includes workers who 
live outside the UA. For most UAs, a residency-based measure of employment will understate 
employment density. The degree of understatement varies considerably across MAs.
13  
While we don’t have an ideal measure of employment density, we employ two 
approximations that should bracket the ideal one. Both measures use the same denominator: the 
sum of the land area lying in the urbanized area portion of the counties that compose an MA. In 
the numerator of the first measure, we use the sum of all (establishment-based) employment 
reported for the same counties. We refer to this measure as MA employment density. In the 
numerator of the second measure, we use (residency-based) employment in the urbanized area 
portion of the same counties, as reported in the 1990 census. We refer to this measure as UA 
employment density. 
To the extent that some metropolitan employment occurs outside of urbanized areas, our 
MA employment density measure will overstate the actual density of jobs in the built-up portion 
of MAs. We believe the extent of this overstatement is small and this measure is distinctly 
superior to alternative measures. In 1990 urbanized areas accounted for 87 percent of the non-
rural land area of MSAs, 94 percent of the non-rural population, and 95 percent of non-rural 
employment by place of residence. The latter statistic probably understates the share of jobs 
                                                 
13 The ratio of residency-based employment in UAs to establishment-based employment in the associated MAs in 
our data set is 0.58. The ratio varies from as little as 0.24 in Visalia, CA, to as high as 0.91 in Fort Lauderdale, FL.   
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located in urbanized areas because, as Glaeser and Kahn [23] show, MSA employment is more 
tightly distributed around the central business district than are residents.  
In any case, the most likely effect of such measurement error in our regressions would be 
a negative bias in the coefficient on employment density. That is because we include in our 
density measure jobs (in “rural” parts of the MA) less likely to be associated with innovation. In 
that sense, any bias works against our hypothesis. To be conservative, however, we also ran our 
regressions using our alternative measure, UA employment density. In addition, we report 
regressions where we instrument for each density measure to better control for possible 
endogeneity bias or measurement error.
14 
3.4 Local market structure and industrial diversification  
  To investigate the potential effects of local labor market structure on inventive output, we 
construct a variable similar to one suggested in Glaeser, et al. [24]—the number of 
establishments per worker in the metropolitan area. According to this definition, the higher this 
ratio, the more competitive is the local labor market. This variable may capture more than a static 
sense of industrial structure. If cities, or industries within a city, are experiencing considerable 
entry or start-up activity, one would expect average establishment size to be smaller.  
  To explore the possible effects of local industrial diversification or specialization, we 
construct a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of industry employment shares. Specifically, we 
calculate the sum of the square of MA employment shares, in 1989, accounted for by seven one-
digit SIC industries, plus federal civilian jobs, state and local government jobs, and the 
remainder. Higher values of this index for an MA imply that its economy is more highly 
                                                 
14 There is another source of potential downward bias in our coefficients. As noted earlier, a number of papers find 
that knowledge spillovers are highly localized, dissipating rapidly with distance from the source. Since we are using 
UAs or MAs as our unit of analysis, the coefficients on employment density we obtain may be underestimates.    
13
specialized.   
3.5 Local research inputs  
  Given that our regression relies on a cross section, it is important to take into account 
factors that influence overall productivity in a city. We include many control variables for this 
purpose. For example, it is well known that patent propensity varies significantly across 
industries, so we include in our regressions the shares of total MA employment in manufacturing 
and eight other industrial sectors.  
We also control for the concentration of firms located in high technology industries. We 
do this by calculating the share of patents obtained in an MA for the years 1980-89 owned by 
firms in research-intensive industries.
15 To control for variations in patent propensity by field of 
technology, we computed the shares of patents obtained in each MA during 1980-89 categorized 
into one of six technology groups as defined in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [26].
16  
It is especially important to control for local inputs into the R&D process. To account for 
the relative abundance of local human capital, our regressions include the share of the population 
(over 25 years of age) with a college degree or more education in 1990. We also control for the 
influence of having many nearby universities, a possible college town effect, by including the 
ratio of college enrollment to population in the years 1987-89.  
We include three other measures of research inputs in terms of their intensities.
17 First, 
we include in our regressions the sum of spending on R&D in science and engineering at local 
colleges and universities divided by full-time enrollment at colleges and universities in the MA 
                                                 
15 See section A.1. of  the Appendix for details on the construction of this variable. 
16 Every patent in our data set was assigned to one of six broad categories (chemical, computer, medical, electrical, 
mechanical, and all other). We included the shares of the first five categories in our regressions.   
17 Not surprisingly, the levels of these inputs are highly correlated with city size.  
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over the years 1987-89.
18 We hope to capture the intensive margin—the R&D resources 
available to potential researchers.
19 Similarly, 
 our regressions include the sum of federal funding 
at government research laboratories in the MA divided by the number of federal civilian 
employees in the MA (averaged over the period 1987-89). Finally, we include in our regressions 
the number of private R&D facilities in 1989 divided by the number of private non-farm 
establishments.
20   
3.6 Other control variables 
Does a correlation between patent intensity and employment density reflect an actual 
difference in inventive activity or, instead, differences in the way firms protect their inventions? 
In her study of innovations in 19
th century Britain, Moser [40] suggests that firms in industries 
that rely less on patents tend to locate more closely together, while the opposite is true for firms 
in industries that rely more on patents. In this paper, our regressions are based on aggregate 
patenting per capita at the MA level, so we are unable to account for such patterns here. But 
Moser also suggests that firms located in the most dense areas may rely more on patenting than 
they otherwise would if it is more difficult to maintain trade secrets in such environments. In that 
case, greater difficulty in maintaining secrecy, rather than spillovers, might explain our results.  
To test the significance of this alternative explanation, we create an index of the 
importance of trade secrecy that varies across metropolitan areas. We do this by weighting 
industry-specific measures of the effectiveness of trade secrecy reported in Cohen, Nelson, and 
                                                 
18 Ideally, we would want to normalize by full-time S&E faculty or graduate students, but these cannot easily be 
assigned to particular campuses for a number of university systems that account for a significant portion of R&D.  
19Anselin, Varga, and Acs [4]  review studies examining localized spillovers from university R&D. Andersson, 
Quigley, and Wilhelmsson [3] find evidence that the expansion of the number of university-based researchers in a 
local labor market is positively associated with an increase in the number of patents granted in that area. 
20 Over 1,800 private labs associated with the top 500 R&D performing corporations were geographically located 
using information contained in the Bowker Directory of American Research and Technology [13].  
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Walsh [18] by the industry shares reflected in the mix of private R&D facilities in every MA in 
our data set. A higher value of this index for an MA implies that trade secrets are relatively more 
effective for the mix of industries reflected in its R&D facilities. In addition, all of our 
regressions control for the local mix of industries and technologies (see above). 
We include a number of other control variables. We control for variations in 
demographics by including the share of the population in 1990 that is of working age. We also 
include the percent change in employment over the years 1980-89 as a control for the effects of 
unobserved differences in local economic opportunities on inventive activity. We also include 
seven dummy variables based on the BEA economic region in which the MA is located (the 
Rocky Mountain region is omitted). 
3.7 Our specification  
  Our main regression equation is simply:  
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4. Main results 
  Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The average 
number of patents per 10,000 of population obtained over the 1990s—our measure of patent 
intensity—is about 2. San Jose stands out, with a patent intensity of 17. At the other end of the 
distribution, the patent intensity for McAllen, TX, is only 0.07. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
skewness of patent intensity across cities.    
The urbanized land area of MAs varies considerably across cities: For Grand Forks it is 
less than 15 square miles; for New York-Northeastern New Jersey, it exceeds 3,000 square 
miles. Establishment-based employment in our MAs varies from 37,000 (Caspar, WY) to 9.6 
million (New York-Northeastern New Jersey), while residency-based employment in the 
urbanized areas of these MAs varies from 17,000 to 7.6 million. The mean of MA employment 
density is 1,727 jobs per square mile while the mean of UA employment density is 987 jobs per 
square mile. The latter varies from 263 jobs per square mile (Gadsden, AL) to 2,777 jobs per  
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square mile (Los Angeles-Long Beach).  
Figure 2 plots the log of patent intensity against the log of MA employment density. A 
moderate correlation (0.39) is clearly evident; there is a similar correlation between patent 
intensity and UA employment density. In the regressions that follow, we explore how much of 
this correlation remains after controlling for the many other factors that are likely to influence 
inventive activity. The model is estimated using ordinary least squares in STATA, but we report 
robust standard errors (White correction) to control for any heteroskedasticity.  
4.1 Employment density and city size 
 Table 2 presents the main results of the paper. The regressions in columns 1 and 3 show 
that, however measured, the effect of employment density on patent intensity is positive and 
statistically significant.
21 These coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. All else equal, 
patent intensity is about 17 percent to 20 percent higher in an MA that is twice as dense as 
another MA. Employment density varies by more than 1,200 percent across the sample, so the 
implied gains in the per capita invention rate are substantial. 
  Columns 2 and 4 report the results from regressions that add the square of our density 
measures as independent variables. There is clear evidence of diminishing returns at very high 
density levels. The optimal level—according to our MA employment density measure—is 2,190 
jobs per square mile.
22 That is about the 75
th percentile of our data set, about the levels of 
Baltimore (2,168) and Philadelphia (2,181). In section 5, we explore more narrow definitions of 
employment density (e.g., scientists and engineers). We again find evidence of an optimal 
density using these measures, but only at levels attained by about 10 percent of our sample.  
                                                 
21 Unless otherwise noted, t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
22 The 95 percent confidence interval on this estimate is 1,418 - 3,384 jobs per square mile.  
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We now turn to the question of scale economies in the more traditional sense. Previous 
research (Feldman and Audretsch [21], O hUallachain [41], and Bettencourt, Lobo and Strumsky 
[12]) suggests that measures of innovation are positively related to metropolitan size 
(population). Similarly, Ciccone and Hall [17] argue that the positive coefficient between 
average labor productivity and employment density implies that agglomeration effects dominate 
congestion effects. In their analysis, the elasticities for the agglomeration and congestion effects 
are assumed to be constant. We relax that assumption here, allowing for diminishing returns to 
scale and density as congestion effects become larger.  
  What do we find? When we include MA employment (in logs), but not its square, in our 
regressions (not shown), the coefficient on this measure of city size is not statistically 
significant.
23 When we include the squared term, as we report in Table 2, the coefficients on 
these variables are statistically significant. The implied optimal size, measured in terms of MA 
employment, is about 500,000 jobs, about the 80
th percentile of the size distribution in our data.
24 
If we assume a labor force participation rate of 66 percent, this corresponds to a population of 
about 750,000, roughly the size of Austin, TX, or Raleigh-Durham, NC, in 1990. Thus, after 
controlling for the effects of employment density, the benefits of urban scale are realized for 
cities of moderate size. In fact, with the exception of San Jose, the top 5 percent of our 
metropolitan areas ranked in terms of patent intensity had populations below 1 million in 1989.   
4.2 Local competition  
  The regressions suggest that the rate of innovation is enhanced in more competitive local 
environments characterized by many small firms, rather than in local economies dominated by a 
                                                 
23 The coefficient is 0.03 with a p value of about 0.40. 
24 The 95 percent confidence interval for this estimate is 236,448 - 1,071,271.  
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few large firms. The coefficient on the number of establishments per employee is about 1.6 and 
is precisely measured. The coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity, since the variable is 
included in logs in our regression. The effect is economically significant, as this ratio more than 
doubles across our sample. This result is consistent with the views of Chinitz [16], Feldman and 
Audretsch [21], Glaeser, et al. [24], and Jacobs [30] that competitive local labor markets 
facilitate innovation. We are not able to determine whether this results from static (market 
structure) or dynamic (firm entry) effects, or both. 
  4.3 Industrial mix and specialization  
Patent activity varies enormously across industries. As expected, the manufacturing share 
of MA employment is positively related to local patent intensity. All else equal, a 10 percent 
increase in the manufacturing share of employment is associated with a 3 percent increase in 
patent intensity. Conversely, a 10 percent increase in the state and local government share of 
employment is associated with a 4.5 percent decrease in patent intensity.  
If knowledge spillovers occur largely within industries, specialized cities may be more 
efficient producers of inventions. On the other hand, if important spillovers are generated across 
industries, perhaps more industrially diverse cities may be more efficient innovators. To test for 
such effects, we constructed a commonly used measure of concentration, an HHI of industry 
employment shares (see section 3). When we include this variable in our regressions (not 
shown), the estimated coefficient is never statistically significant.
25 We also constructed a 
measure of technological specialization using our technology share controls. When we included 
this variable in our regressions (not shown), the estimated coefficient was negative, but not 
significant (p = 0.13). In short, our results suggest that while the mix of industries is obviously 
                                                 
25 When all our employment shares are also included, the coefficient on HHI is essentially zero. If we include only 
the manufacturing share of employment, the coefficient on HHI is negative, but not significant.  
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important in explaining the overall patent intensity of cities, the concentration or dispersion of 
economic activity across industries does not appear to have an independent effect.   
4.4 Local research inputs  
  The results reported in Table 2 clearly show that local research inputs are important to 
explaining the variation in patent intensity across MAs. The coefficients on our controls for 
research-intensive industries and the controls for most technology fields are statistically 
significant and precisely measured. These variables capture characteristics relevant to patent 
intensity that are not fully explained by local industry mix and structure. The largest elasticities, 
evaluated at the mean, are for chemical inventions (0.30), mechanical inventions (0.24), 
computers (0.19), and high-technology industries (0.16). 
  By far the most powerful effect is generated by human capital (the share of the adult 
population with at least a college degree). A 10 percent increase in this ratio is associated with an 
8.6 percent increase in patents per capita. We also included a variable to capture the relative size 
of higher education in a metropolitan area—the ratio of college enrollment to population. The 
coefficient on this variable (not shown) is not significant in our regressions, suggesting there is 
no separate college town effect on the local invention rate.
26  
  Our other controls for local research intensities include the ratio of academic R&D in 
science and engineering to student enrollment (in 1987-89), federal lab R&D spending per 
federal civilian employee (in 1987-89), and the number of private R&D labs per 1,000 
establishments (1989). All of these variables have a positive impact on the rate of patenting, but 
the implied elasticities are relatively small. For example, a 10 percent increase in private R&D 
intensity is associated with only a 1 percent increase in patent intensity. The elasticity for 
                                                 
26 In other regressions we included the log of the number of colleges and universities in the MA. But the coefficient 
on this variable is never statistically significant.  
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academic R&D intensity is slightly smaller (.08). Still, these effects are economically significant 
because there is considerable variation in academic and private R&D intensity in our data (see 
Table 1). 
  Agrawal and Cockburn [1] argue that local academic R&D is likely more productive, in 
terms of its contribution to additional patents, in the presence of a large research-intensive firm 
located nearby—the anchor tenant hypothesis. Taking this effect into account, they report a 
significant positive correlation between local patents and academic publications in the fields of 
medical imaging, neural networks, and signal processing. We looked for a more general 
interaction—do cities with a relative abundance of academic and private R&D enjoy a 
disproportionately high patent intensity? We tested for this by interacting our measures of 
academic and private R&D intensity and including them in our regressions (not shown). We 
were surprised to find a significant, but negative coefficient (-0.13) on this interaction term.
27 
There does appear to be some degree of substitution between local academic and private R&D 
investments, but the effect is quite small—the implied elasticity at the mean is -0.03.
28 
4.5 Trade secret protection   
Recall that we constructed an index of the efficacy of trade secret protection among firms 
located in an MA. If the estimated coefficient on this variable is negative, we might be concerned 
that firms are substituting patents for trade secret protection in dense areas because the former 
are relatively more effective in such environments. We find, instead, the estimated coefficient is 
positive but insignificant at standard confidence levels. This is consistent with Cohen, Nelson, 
                                                 
27 The p value is 0.026. The coefficients on the academic and private R&D variables remain significant; in fact they 
increase by more than the estimated coefficient on the interaction (but the changes in these coefficients are not 
statistically significant). The other regression coefficients hardly change. Note that the correlation between the 
private and academic R&D intensities in our data is only 0.17.  
28 We also interacted the R&D intensity of private and government labs, but found no significant effects.  
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and Walsh [18], who find a positive correlation in firms’ rating of the effectiveness of trade 
secrecy and patent protection. It is also consistent with the result in Fosfuri and Rønde [22], who 
find that trade secret protection stimulates clustering in a model of firm location in the presence 
of information spillovers. In any case, city size and employment density remain important in 
explaining patent intensity even after controlling for an industry’s reliance on trade secret 
protection.  
Helsley and Strange [27] argue that knowledge transfers between agents may arise 
through a form of barter in the absence of established property rights in the underlying ideas. 
They argue this barter process may be more effective in smaller metropolitan areas where 
anonymity is harder to maintain. In larger MAs, informal exchange (or cooperation) may become 
unsustainable and agents are forced to patent their ideas before they can exchange them for 
anything valuable. To test this hypothesis, we interacted our trade secrets variable with city size 
and, alternatively, with employment density (not shown), but we did not find any statistically 
significant interactions. These results suggest that the phenomenon we are measuring is real, i.e., 
there really are more inventions.  
4.6 Employment growth and other control variables  
  The coefficient on employment growth in the previous decade (not shown) is positive but 
not statistically significant in our main regressions (it is sometimes significant in other 
specifications).
29 This is true even when we drop our establishments per worker variable, which 
might also pick up variations in city or industry dynamics. Our demographic control, the share of 
the population of working age (not shown), is always positive but is statistically significant in 
only some regressions. The estimated coefficients on two of the seven BEA region dummies (not 
                                                 
29 It varies from about 0.28 to about 0.34 in the regressions reported in Table 2.  
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shown) are statistically significant. MAs located in the New England and Southwest regions had 
lower patent intensities. Overall, it appears that our controls do a good job of accounting for the 
other factors that contribute to innovation in cities.  
5. The density of knowledge workers  
  To this point, our measures of employment density reflect the entire workforce of the 
MA. Not all of these jobs are directly involved in the process of inventing new products or 
processes. So it is reasonable to ask whether it would be better to instead focus on a measure of 
occupations consisting of the knowledge workers in an MA.  
  We avoid doing this in our main regressions (Table 2) for several reasons. First, it is not 
obvious what the appropriate set of occupations should be. Second, a substantial amount of 
invention occurs when users of a product or process modify it to suit their particular needs 
(Morrison, Roberts, and Von Hippel [39]). These users may not fall into the occupations we 
might include in the class of knowledge workers. Third, our industry, technology, and human 
capital controls ought to absorb most of the effect of the unobserved variation in the composition 
of the workforce. If our general measures impart a bias, then the bias should work against us. 
Nevertheless, we re-estimate our specifications using two more narrow measures of 
employment density. The first includes only those jobs falling into the Census Bureau’s 
classification of professional specialty occupations. This grouping includes engineers, scientists, 
social scientists, doctors, and other health professionals. But it also includes teachers, lawyers, 
artists, and athletes. The second includes only scientists and engineers living in the urbanized 
area in 1990. Both of these are residency-based measures of employment in 1990.   
  In Table 3, we report results using each measure in our primary specifications. In the first 
and third columns of the table, we show that the estimated coefficient on employment density is  
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about 0.22 and is measured very precisely (p < 0.01). The estimated coefficients on most other 
variables change only slightly. The estimated coefficient on our human capital measure falls a 
bit, especially when we use the density of scientists and engineers in our regressions. The 
estimated coefficients on manufacturing employment share are also a bit smaller.  
  We also constructed a density measure counting only jobs that do not fall into the Census 
Bureau’s professional and specialty classification. This measure explicitly excludes scientists, 
engineers, medical professionals, and college professors. If we include only this measure of 
density in our regression (not shown), the estimated coefficient is 0.19 and is statistically 
significant (p < 0.05). If we include both density measures in the regression (not shown), 
professional specialty occupations and the other jobs, the coefficient on the latter measure is 
negative but insignificant, while the coefficient on the former measure rises and remains 
significant. We conclude that while much of the effect of density on patent intensity is 
concentrated in these more narrow categories of jobs, using our general measures of job density 
does not bias our results. 
  Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 verify there are diminishing returns to employment density 
even when using these measures. The optimal density of professional specialists is 320 per 
square mile, the 88
th percentile of our sample. The optimal density of scientists and engineers is 
57 per square mile, the 92
nd percentile of our sample. Thus, in our data, relatively few MAs 
exhaust the returns to scale associated with the density of these jobs. The estimated optimal 
scale, measured in terms of population, in these regressions falls to about 650,000 to 700,000. 
6. Testing for robustness 
In this section, we examine a number of factors that might potentially affect our results. 
We consider alternative specifications, reverse causation and endogeneity bias, and spatial  
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dependence. None of the main results are affected after controlling for these issues.   
6.1 Alternative specifications  
To this point, we have associated inventions with MAs on the basis of the home address 
of the first inventor listed on the patent. One might wonder about how the first inventor is 
selected and whether this process might affect our regression results. For example, suppose a 
multinational company patents an invention developed by researchers working in separate labs in 
different cities or even countries.  
For a variety of reasons, we do not believe such concerns should significantly affect our 
results. About 49 percent of our patents have only one inventor. Among the other patents, only 
2.6 percent involve inventors living in different countries, and only a third of these report a first 
inventor living in the U.S. Among the patents where the first two inventors live in an American 
city, nearly 70 percent live in the same MA. When inventors do live in separate MAs, they tend 
to live far apart. The average distance is 560 miles. 
Table 4 reports two sets of regressions. The first two columns of Table 4 are based on the 
same specification reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2, except we add 3 new variables to the 
regressions: the share of the MA’s patents with a second inventor residing in another MA, the 
log of the average distance between inventors’ MAs for those patents, and the square of this 
distance. The coefficient on each of these variables is statistically significant. All else equal, the 
higher the share of an MA’s patents with a second inventor living in another MA, the lower is 
the MA’s patent intensity. This is not surprising as it is likely that firms with a more 
decentralized workforce are also likely to have a more even spatial distribution of patents. The 
estimated coefficients on our density measures are somewhat larger than reported in Table 2, 
while the estimated optimal city size falls to about 500,000.   
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Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on the average distance between inventors’ MAs 
is positive (the coefficient on the square of distance is negative). Conditional on relying on a 
distant co-inventor, the optimal distance between MAs is 270-330 miles, depending on the 
density measure used in the regression. These results suggest that inventors may be taking 
advantage of differentiated knowledge available in other MAs, a finding consistent with the 
intuition of Berliant, Reed, and Wang [11].   
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 we report the findings when we repeat the specification 
used in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2, except that the observations are based on the address of the 
second inventor on the patents. The coefficients on the density and size variables are statistically 
significant and take the same sign as in Table 2. Similar results (not shown) are obtained when 
we use any of our other density measures. We conclude that our findings are not sensitive to the 
choice of the first inventor’s address in our analysis. 
6.2 Reverse causation, endogeneity, and consumption amenities  
  Our regressions estimate the effects of employment density and city size on patent 
intensity. In this section, we directly address the possibility of reverse causation—patent 
intensity might affect city size, employment density, or both.  
  We begin with simple Granger causality tests (not shown). In the forward regression, we 
regress patent intensity in the 1990s on patent intensity in 1975-79, and MA employment density 
in 1989 (all in log form). The coefficient on the last of these variables is 0.43 and significant at 
the 1 percent level. In the reverse regression, we regress MA employment density over the 1990s 
on employment density in 1989 and patent intensity in 1975-79 (all in log form). The coefficient 
on the lag of patent intensity is significant at the 1 percent level, but the coefficient is also very 
small (-0.01). While we reject the hypothesis of no reverse causation, the estimated effect is  
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more than an order of magnitude smaller than the relationships estimated in our main 
regressions.  
  Even though all of our independent variables are significantly lagged, one may still be 
concerned about the possibility of endogeneity and a resulting bias in the estimated coefficients. 
A related concern is that a correlation between patent intensity and employment density might 
occur if highly productive (i.e., inventive) workers are attracted to MAs by consumption 
amenities (e.g., variety) not adequately controlled for in our regressions and which are not 
already reflected in our human capital variables.
30 To address these possibilities, we perform 
instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions and examine Hausman tests for endogeneity bias. We 
instrument for employment density, employment, and its square.  
In addition to the other right-hand-side variables in our main regressions, we include as 
instruments a variety of weather and topographic variables. The existence of a significant 
correlation between such variables and density has been documented in other work (Rappaport 
[43]). We also include deep lags of MA urbanized land area (1980) and employment (1970), in 
logs, and the square of these variables. Finally, to address the possibility that other consumption 
amenities explain our results, we include as instruments the number of museums, restaurants, 
violent crimes, and property crimes in 1989, each expressed in per capita terms.
31 
Our weather and topography variables are derived from the USDA’s Economic Research 
Service Natural Amenity Scale.
32 These data are reported at the county level and include mean 
hours of sunlight in January, mean temperature in January and July, and the percent of county 
                                                 
30 While it is possible that such amenities may attract more population, and thus employees, it does not explain the 
negative correlation between patent intensity and urbanized land area in a regression (not shown) controlling for 
employment and our other control variables.   
31 These data are derived from County Business Patterns.  
32 For more information, see http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/naturalamenities and McGranahan [37]).   
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area covered by water. These variables are aggregated to MAs, weighting by county land area.
33 
We also construct dummy variables that reflect the presence of five topographic features in MA 
counties: plains, tablelands, open hills and mountains, hills and mountains, and plains with hills 
and mountains.  
The F statistic in each of the first stage regressions is at least 24 or higher, suggesting that 
our instruments are strong. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 report OLS estimates for the same 
sample of cities we can estimate using our instruments (we lose six observations owing to 
missing variables). Columns 2 and 4 report the coefficients from the instrumental variables (IV) 
regressions. The estimated coefficients on MA employment density fall somewhat relative to 
OLS in the IV regression but the opposite pattern is observed when we examine the regressions 
with UA employment density. This is what we would expect when we correct for measurement 
error in these two variables (see section III). In any case, Hausman tests do not identify any 
systematic differences between the OLS and IV coefficients in these regressions.    
We also performed IV regressions using an even deeper lag of urbanized land area (1970) 
as an instrument (not shown). The estimated coefficients on employment density and city size 
are slightly larger than the comparable OLS estimates, but they are no longer statistically 
significant.
34 Again, Hausman tests do not identify any systematic differences between the IV 
and OLS estimates. We conclude that any remaining endogeneity in our regressions is unlikely 
to explain our main results.  
6.3 Spatial dependence  
  There is a very high degree of spatial inequality in the distribution of patent activity. 
                                                 
33 We also include the water area of MA counties, in square miles, as reported by the Census Bureau for 1990. 
34 In these regressions, the p values for the coefficients on MA and UA employment density, respectively, are 0.12 
and 0.16. The sample size in these regressions is only 227.  
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Patenting tends to be highly concentrated in the metropolitan areas of the northeast corridor, 
around the Research Triangle in North Carolina, and in California’s Silicon Valley. Even though 
the coefficients on our regional dummy variables are typically insignificant, this clustering of 
innovative activity suggests there could be strong spatial dependence at a more localized level 
and, if so, it should be controlled for in our empirical analysis.   
The conjecture, then, is that patent intensity in one MA may be highly correlated with 
patent intensity in nearby MAs. The consequences of spatial autocorrelation are the same as 
those associated with serial correlation and heteroskedasticity:  When the error terms across MAs 
in our sample are correlated, OLS estimation is unbiased but inefficient. However, if the spatial 
correlation is due to the direct influence of neighboring MAs, OLS estimation is biased and 
inefficient (Anselin [7]).   
The literature suggests two approaches to dealing with spatial dependence. In the first 









where   is the spatial autoregressive parameter and   is the uncorrelated error term. λ µ  W is a 
spatial weighting matrix where nonzero off-diagonal elements represent the strength of the 
potential interaction between the ith and jth MAs. We use the inverse of the square of the 
geographic distance between MAs to fill in the off-diagonal elements of W . The null hypothesis 
of no spatial error dependence is 0 :0 H λ = . 
  The second approach models the spatial dependence in patenting activity via a spatially 
“lagged” dependent variable: 
PW P X ρ βε = ++   
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where P is an Nx1 vector and N is the number of locations in our study; ρ  is the autoregressive 
parameter (a scalar); W  is the NxN spatial weight matrix described above; X is an NxK matrix of 
other explanatory variables from before; and ε  is the Nx1 random error term. The null 
hypothesis of no spatial lag is 0 :0 H ρ = . 
  Following Anselin and Hudak [5], we perform three tests for spatial autocorrelated 
errors: Moran’s I test, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, and a robust Lagrange multiplier test 
(robust LM). We also perform two tests for the spatial lag model (LM test and a robust LM test). 
The Moran’s I test is normally distributed, while the LM tests are distributed 
2 χ  with k and one 
degree of freedom, respectively.   
  We estimate each of the specifications previously reported in Table 2 using these various 
tests for spatial dependence. The results are summarized in Table 6. The null hypothesis of zero 
spatial lag cannot be rejected in any specification. The results for spatial error are somewhat 
more ambiguous. The null hypothesis is clearly rejected according to the Moran’s I test, but not 
according to the LM and robust LM tests. Anselin [6] reports that the Lagrange multiplier tests 
are more robust than the Moran’s I test under Monte Carlo simulations, which suggests that 
spatial error is unlikely to be an issue for our specifications.  
Nevertheless, we re-estimate each specification reported in Table 2, incorporating a 
correction for either spatial error or spatial lag. Table 7 presents the results for the specifications 
used in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.
35 As expected, we did not find any instances of a significant 
spatial error or spatial lag coefficient. The primary effect of using maximum likelihood 
procedures is that most of the coefficients are estimated more precisely. 
                                                 
35 These estimates were obtained using the Spatreg procedure in STATA. The results for the specifications reported 
in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 are nearly identical to the OLS results.  
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7. Conclusion 
Patent intensity—the per capita invention rate—is positively related to the density of 
employment in the highly urbanized portion of MAs. All else equal, the number of inventions 
per person is about 20 percent greater in an MA with a local economy that is twice as dense as 
another MA. Since local employment density doubles more than four times in the sample, the 
implied gains in patents per capita due to urban density are substantial. In short, we find 
empirical evidence consistent with a theoretical micro foundation of endogenous growth. In 
addition, we find evidence of increasing returns to scale in the invention process, but holding 
density constant, these returns are exhausted at a modest city size—certainly below 1 million in 
population. Similarly, we find evidence of diminishing returns to density, but only at levels 
attained by a quarter of our sample.
36  
Our results also support theories that suggest that more competitive local market 
structures are more conducive to innovation. We find that industrial and technology mix are 
important in explaining the variation in patent intensity across cities, but we found no significant 
effects for our measures of industrial or technological specialization. We found that local R&D 
inputs, especially human capital, contribute to higher patent intensities and there is evidence of a 
very modest substitution effect between academic and private R&D intensity. Variations in the 
reliance of a city’s industries on trade secret protection did not have a significant effect in our 
regressions. 
In the empirical work we have been careful in our definition of the unit of analysis and 
the inclusion of control variables that reflect the available resources (e.g. R&D, human capital, 
etc.) that are relevant to the local output of innovations. Thus we believe our coefficients on city 
                                                 
36 Diminishing returns to density sets in much later in our sample (about the 90th percentile) if we instead use only 
scientists and engineers in our density measure.  
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size and density reflect effects that are external to the firm, but not to the city itself. On the other 
hand, our regressions are not sufficient to identify a particular mechanism that explains why 
these externalities are important. We have suggested a few possibilities, such as better matches 
between firms and workers or easier transmission of tacit knowledge, but our technique cannot 
distinguish among them. In order to do so, we require more refined theories and yet more data. 
To investigate these questions more precisely, one might examine an additional direction 
of cross-sectional variation, that is, differences across industries. In particular, this would allow 
one to test the significance of urbanization economies (city size) and localization economies (the 
local size of the industry).
37 A stronger approach is to focus on firms, the source of most of the 
innovations in our data, and to investigate the contribution of city characteristics to the 
productivity of the research efforts located in them. These are topics of our ongoing research. 
APPENDIX A 
A.1. Patent data 
  Our patent data are derived from data sets furnished by the Technology Forecasting and 
Assessment Branch of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. These include the US Patent 
Inventor File 1977-99: All Grants; 75-76 Utility Patents Only and the PATSIC99 file.  
We assemble the home address information of the first inventor named on each patent from the 
inventor’s file. We began with 1,198,376 patents granted to inventors with an American address 
over the years 1975-1999. We assigned a state-county FIPS code for each patent by matching 
address information against the 1998 vintage of NIST’s FIPS55 place names data set. We 
obtained unique ZIP code-county and place name-county matches for 81 percent of the patents. 
For another 8.5 percent of the patents, we could not initially identify a unique county for the 
inventor but we could identify a unique metropolitan area. Another 6.6 percent of patents were 
geographically located via matches against the location of an R&D lab of the firm owning the 
patent and manual searches.  
In all 1,155,133 patents were matched to a county or an MA, while 43,243 were not. Of those 
patents that were successfully placed in an MSA, 581,001 were granted between 1990 and 1999 
(inclusive); 46,647 were located outside an MSA. That leaves 534,354 patents in MAs that were 
used to construct the patent variable.  
                                                 
37 For preliminary work in this direction see Carlino and Hunt [15].  
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The field of technology dummies (medical, chemical, computer, electrical, and mechanical) are 
constructed by matching the primary classification number of each of our patents to one of the 
sets of classifications contained in Appendix 1 of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [26].  
To construct the high-technology industry patent share, we match our patent numbers to those 
contained in the NBER Patent Citations Data File, and obtain the CUSIP of the firm that was 
initially assigned the patent. We associate this firm, using its CUSIP, to the SIC assigned to it in 
the 1999 vintage of Standard and Poor’s Compustat. High tech industry patents are those 
associated with firms that have a three digit SIC code in one of the R&D intensive industries 
identified in Office of Technology Policy [55]. We calculate the high tech share of patents in a 
city by dividing this number by the number of all patents in the city that we can match to a firm 
in the NBER Patent Citations Data File. In total, we were able to match over 141,000 urban 
patents (41percent of the total) granted in the 1980s to firms in the 1999 vintage of Compustat.   
A.2. Our definition of metropolitan areas 
  Our MA definitions are based primarily on MSA definitions defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget in 1983 (http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-
city/83mfips.txt). Several adjustments are made: 
-  The six MSAs in Puerto Rico are removed. 
-  New England County Metropolitan Areas (NECMAs) are used as our MAs in New England. 
-  The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses its own set of county-equivalent codes to 
tabulate data for independent cities and their surrounding counties together. For all data from 
the Regional Economic Information System (REIS), data for our MAs are built up including 
these independent cities. 
-  Nine Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) are employed instead of their 25 
component MSAs: Chicago, IL-IN-WI; Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN; Cleveland-Akron-
Lorain, OH; Dallas-Fort Worth, TX; Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX; Kansas City, KS-
MO; Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA; Seattle-Tacoma, WA; and St. Louis- East St. Louis- 
Alton, IL-MO. 
-  Seven ad hoc metropolitan areas were also created: Denver-Boulder-Greeley (Boulder-
Longmont, CO PMSA; Denver, CO PMSA; & Greeley, CO MSA); Greenville-Anderson 
(Anderson, SC MSA and Greenville-Spartanburg, SC MSA); Los Angeles-Anaheim 
(Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA PMSA and Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA); Midland-
Odessa (Midland, TX MSA and Odessa, TX MSA); New York-Northern New Jersey 
(Bergen-Passaic, Jersey City, Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, Monmouth-Ocean, Nassau-
Suffolk, New York, Newark, Orange County, New York); San Francisco-Oakland (Oakland, 
CA PMSA and San Francisco, CA PMSA); and Sarasota-Bradenton (Bradenton, FL MSA 
and Sarasota, FL MSA).   
We used these definitions for certain cities rather than the underlying MSAs because two or 
more cities shared a common border and we could not always assign some patents (a few 
thousand) to an MSA with certainty (see Patent Data above). If we used the underlying MSAs, 
we would either have to discard these patents or take the chance that the error rate in assigning 
patents to cities might vary systematically across cities. The methodology used in USPTO [56] 
assigns equal shares of patents to counties with common place names when a patent cannot be  
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matched to a unique county. This too might imply a higher error rate in assigning patents when 
MSAs are close to each other.  
We compared our MSA patent counts to those reported in USPTO [56]  and found them to be 
extremely close, except for a few instances. In some cases two or more MSAs were in close 
proximity (e.g., Dallas and Fort Worth). In a few others, the place name of the inventor’s address 
was common to more than one county, regardless of distance. The PTO algorithm divided those 
patents equally across those counties.   
Our definition of metropolitan areas or the manner of allocating patents to MSAs does not 
significantly influence our results. In an earlier version of this paper (Carlino, Chatterjee, and 
Hunt [14]) we estimated the relationship between patent intensity and employment density using 
a data set of 296 MSAs and PMSAs as defined by OMB in 1983 and using patent counts built up 
from the data contained in USPTO [56]. The results were qualitatively the same as those reported 
here, although the estimated coefficients were somewhat larger.  
A.2.1. Missing data 
  Four MSAs are dropped in the analysis because of missing data. One MSA (Enid, OK) 
does not have a corresponding urbanized area. Owing to disclosure limitations, a Herfindahl 
index of industry employment shares cannot be calculated for Atlantic City, NJ, and Tallahassee, 
FL. In addition, manufacturing employment is not available in 1989 for Columbus, GA-AL. 
A.3. Geographic variables 
  Urbanized Area land area for every county was obtained from Table 34 of Census Bureau 
[51]. We also obtained comparable measures for urbanized areas defined in 1980 and 1970 from 
Census Bureau [49], [50]. 
There are a few instances where a county includes land area associated with more than one 
urbanized area. For example, portions of Bucks County, PA, are associated with the Philadelphia 
and Trenton urbanized areas. To be consistent with our other county-based measures, we 
attribute this land area (and associated employment) to the MA associated with that county (e.g., 
Philadelphia). 
The weather and topography instrumental variables are based on the USDA’s Natural Amenity 
Scale project (http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/naturalamenities). The data are reported at county 
level, which we aggregate, based on county land area, to MSAs. We use the variables indicating, 
for the years 1941-1970, mean hours of sunlight and temperature in January, mean temperature 
in July, the percent of land area covered by surface water, and five dummy variables for the 
presence of a particular type of geography (plains, tablelands, open hills and mountains, hills and 
mountains, and plains with hills and mountains) built up from a finer gradation in the ERS data. 
We also included as an instrument the amount of MA area covered by water n 1990. Those data 
were obtained from a county level tabulation reported in the Census Bureau’s Gazeteer 
(http://www.census.gov/geo/www/gazetteer/gazette.html).   
A.4. Economic and demographic variables 
  Our primary employment data are county-level values reported in the BEA’s REIS 
database and aggregated to the MA level. We use the 1999 vintage of these data. The data are 
derived from the BLS Covered Employment and Wages Program (ES-202), which represents the  
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average annual number of full- and part-time jobs held by all workers who are covered by 
unemployment insurance. Industry breakdowns are based on 1987 SIC definitions. 
Our measures of residency-based employment in 1990 were obtained from the Census Bureau 
web site (www.americanfactfinder.com). Those data are derived from the STF3 (5 percent 
sample) tape. A separate count was obtained for every county that includes an urbanized area. 
These are aggregated to MAs in the same manner as our other variables. 
Our counts of employment for professional specialty occupations are derived from the 1990 
census (STF3). This is a residency-based count, but here we include all residents in the counties 
making up an MA, not just residents in the urbanized area portion of those counties. The 
occupation codes for this category of jobs are codes 043-202 in the 1990 Census Occupation 
Classification System. 
Our counts of scientists and engineers are residency-based measures of workers in these 
occupations living in urbanized areas as reported in Table 34 of Census Bureau [53]. We 
aggregated these counts to be consistent with our MA definitions.  
The shares of MSA land area, population, and employment contained in urbanized areas 
discussed in section 3.3 are derived from Tables 48, 50-51 of Census Bureau [51] and Table 33 
of Census Bureau [52] and Census Bureau [53]. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated for 1989 and includes employment for ten 
industrial sectors. These include Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation and Public 
Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Services, Civilian 
Federal Government, State and Local Government, and a category, other, that consists primarily 
of employment in the military, agriculture, and mining. The HHI is calculated at the MA level. 
Wherever county data are missing for 1989, either data from the previous or following year are 
used or MSA-level data are substituted when appropriate.  
The percentage of population with a college degree or more education is derived from the 1990 
Census American Fact Finder. Because these are MSA-level data, it was necessary to create a 
weighted average of component MSAs for the special CMSAs we created; this was done using 
1990 Census Bureau mid-year population estimates aggregated from county level to MSA. The 
population data were also used to calculate our measure of patents per capita. 
Our instrumental variables include a measure of the number of restaurants and museums and 
crimes in 1989. These are derived from county-level data, as reported in County Business 
Patterns, and aggregated to the MA level. They are converted to intensities by dividing by 
population in 1989.  
A.5. Research and development variables 
  The amount of academic R&D in each MSA is derived from the National Science 
Foundation’s (NSF) “Academic Science and Engineering: R&D Expenditures,” as archived in 
the WebCaspar search engine at the NSF web site. Expenditures are averaged over the period 
1987-89 and are normalized by the total fall enrollment as reported in the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System assembled by the National Center for Education Statistics 
and archived on WebCaspar. S&E expenditures reported for a number of university systems 
were also allocated to particular campuses using advanced S&E degrees granted by those 
campuses. Expenditures are built up from counties according to our MA definitions.   
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Data on the location and resources of the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
were provided to us by Ronald Meeks of the National Science Foundation. 
Data on private R&D facilities were extracted from the 1989 edition of the Bowker Directory of 
American Research and Technology [13]. They are matched to the SIC of the parent company 
using the 1999 vintage of Compustat.  
A.6. Trade secrecy index 
  We assigned the industry-specific effectiveness rating in Table 1 of Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh [18] to two-digit or three-digit SIC industries. These ratings are a categorical response to a 
question that asks for the proportion of product innovations for which trade secrets are effective 
in preserving the resulting profits. For each MA, we compute a weighted average of the industry 
ratings using as weights the shares of all private R&D facilities in the MA contained in those 
industries. 
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Figure 2: Patents per Capita & MA Employment Density
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  SD  Min.  Max. 
Patents Per 10,000 of Population, Avg. 1990-99  2.057  2.110  .0732  17.14 
MA Employment Density, 1990  1,727  689.3  408.1  5,021 
UA Employment Density, 1990  987.4  405.9  263.4  2,777 
Urbanized Area Land Area, 1990  211.5  333.5  14.50  3015 
Urbanized Area Land Area, 1980  182.4  298.8  14.00  2808 
Urbanized Area Land Area, 1970  155.2  262.4  2.2  2425 
MA Water Area, 1990  178.4  373.1  .3700  2483 
MA Water Area, 1990 (percent)  7.810  12.58  .0300  65.11 
MA Employment, 1989  392,480  862,483  37,375  9,665,015 
MA Employment, 1970  320,765  719,959  34,059  8,368,789 
UA Employment, 1990  265,431  663,744  17,406  7,563,283 
MA Employment Growth, 1979-89 (percent)  20.47  15.54  -25.80  77.69 
Working Age Population, 1990 (percent)  64.43  3.077  53.85  74.79 
Ratio of UA to MA Employment, 1989-90  .5864  .1350  .2472  .9396 
HHI of Industry Employment Shares, 1989  .1791  .0186  .1456  .2819 
Establishments per 100,000 Employees, 1989  4425  597.8  2667  6365 
Manufacturing Employment, 1989 (percent)  14.92  7.447  1.815  46.06 
Construction Employment, 1989 (percent)  5.371  1.305  2.881  11.02 
Transportation Employment, 1989 (percent)  4.426  1.522  1.553  11.88 
Wholesale Employment, 1989 (percent)  4.349  1.385  .6752  9.178 
Retail Employment, 1989 (percent)  17.71  1.935  11.96  24.83 
Services Employment, 1989 (percent)  25.79  4.207  9.823  44.78 
FIRE Employment, 1989 (percent)  6.729  2.042  2.679  16.68 
Federal Civilian Employment, 1989 (percent)  2.297  2.385  .2936  20.84 
State & Local Gov. Employment, 1989 (percent)  11.74  4.671  4.405  34.55 
High-tech Patents, 1980-89 (percent)  18.78  19.47  0  88.91 
Chemicals Patents, 1980-89 (percent)  17.14  12.82  0  76.11 
Computer Patents, 1980-89 (percent)  5.692  6.453  0  48.23 
Medical Patents, 1980-89 (percent)  9.210  10.55  0  88.00 
Electrical Patents, 1980-89 (percent)  6.418  6.089  0  44.80 
Mechanical Patents, 1980-89 (percent)  24.89  10.03  5.600  62.37 
College Educated, 1990 (percent)  19.54  6.235  8.100  45.40 
Enrolled in College, 1987-89 (percent)  6.661  5.423  0  34.06 
University R&D Spending ($1,000) per Student, 
Avg. 1987-89  .5623 .9324  0  5.297 
Federal Lab R&D Spending ($1,000) per Federal 
Civilian Employee, 1987-89  1.396 10.81  0  161.4 
Private R&D Labs per 1,000 Establishments, 1989  .3037  .3863  0  2.710 
Trade Secrets Index  50.96  5.382  34.04  70.69 
Restaurants per 10,000 of Population, 1989  16.28  2.676  8.910  29.06 
Museums per 10,000 of Population, 1989  .1308  .0917  0  .4806 
Violent Crimes per 10,000 of Population, 1989  54.35  30.71  6.604  220.4 
Property Crimes per 10,000 of Population, 1989  521.8  165.1  140.7  956.9 
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Table 2: Patent Intensity Regressions – Robust Standard Errors 
Dependent Variable: Patents per Capita†   1 2 3  4 




   
MA Employment Density Squared †     -0.269 
(2.14)**    




UA Employment Density Squared †       -0.273 
(1.92)* 
















































































































































































Trade Secrets Index (Lab-weighted)
















Adjusted R-squared  0.786 0.789 0.784  0.787 
Notes: N = 280. Regressions include a lag of MA employment growth, the share of the population enrolled in college, the share 
of the population of working age, a constant, and BEA region dummies. † Included in log form in regression.  
* significant at 10 percent. ** significant at 5 percent. *** significant at 1 percent.    
44
Table 3: Knowledge Worker Regressions – Robust Standard Errors 





0.228 2.125      Professional Specialty Jobs Density, 1990†  
(2.72)*** (2.18)**     
 -0.185     Professional Specialty Jobs Density Squared †  
 (1.94)*    
   0.218  0.601  Scientists & Engineers Density, 1990 †  
   (3.05)***  (3.14)*** 
    -0.074  Scientists & Engineers Density Squared  †  
    (2.16)** 
0.396 0.343 0.343  0.271  MA Employment (10,000), 1989†  
(2.69)*** (2.23)**  (2.28)**  (1.75)* 
-0.053 -0.045 -0.048  -0.036  MA Employment Squared†  
(2.93)*** (2.35)** (2.73)***  (1.93)* 
1.526 1.530 1.468  1.420  Establishments per Employee, 1989 †  
(4.55)*** (4.61)*** (4.44)***  (4.40)*** 
2.017 1.842 1.629  1.500  Manufacturing Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(2.95)*** (2.72)***  (2.43)**  (2.23)** 
-0.338 -0.080 -1.908  -2.066  Construction Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(0.11) (0.03) (0.62)  (0.67) 
-3.078 -3.391 -4.540  -4.762  Transportation Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(1.17) (1.30)  (1.70)* (1.81)* 
-2.335 -2.836 -0.773  -1.326  Wholesale Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(0.73) (0.90) (0.24)  (0.43) 
-4.025 -4.772 -3.859  -4.393  Retail Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(1.81)* (2.18)** (1.78)*  (2.06)** 
0.154 -0.099 -0.297  -0.401  Services Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(0.16) (0.11) (0.32)  (0.43) 
1.298 1.130 0.411  0.322  FIRE Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(0.70) (0.62) (0.22)  (0.18) 
-2.259 -2.637 -3.455  -3.523  Federal Civilian Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(1.61) (1.87)*  (2.51)**  (2.57)** 
-4.246 -4.325 -4.390  -4.507  State & Local Gov. Employment, 1989 (percent) 
(3.38)*** (3.41)*** (3.31)***  (3.43)*** 
0.834 0.815 0.779  0.800  High-tech Patents, 1980-89 (percent) 
(4.32)*** (4.18)*** (4.18)***  (4.22)*** 
1.706 1.693 1.639  1.616  Chemicals Patents, 1980-89 (percent) 
(4.27)*** (4.23)*** (4.08)***  (4.04)*** 
3.165 3.257 2.807  2.984  Computer Patents, 1980-89 (percent) 
(5.30)*** (5.46)*** (4.45)***  (4.67)*** 
-0.440 -0.346 -0.386  -0.403  Medical Patents, 1980-89 (percent) 
(0.72) (0.57) (0.64)  (0.67) 
0.877 0.964 0.801  0.893  Electrical Patents, 1980-89 (percent) 
(1.91)* (2.15)** (1.81)*  (1.99)** 
0.967 0.965 0.854  0.847  Mechanical Patents, 1980-89 (percent) 
(2.21)** (2.19)** (2.00)**  (2.02)** 
4.226 4.316 3.929  4.007  College Educated, 1990 (percent) 
(4.73)*** (4.90)*** (4.43)***  (4.56)*** 
0.140 0.137 0.136  0.145  University R&D per Student, 1987-89 
(3.03)*** (2.98)*** (3.06)***  (3.20)*** 
0.007 0.006 0.005  0.005  Federal Lab R&D / Fed Civ Jobs, 1987-89 
(3.70)*** (3.44)***  (2.58)**  (2.55)** 
0.330 0.336 0.282  0.341  Private R&D Labs / Establishments, 1989 
(4.50)*** (4.87)*** (3.81)***  (4.65)*** 
0.312 0.315 0.376  0.342  Trade Secrets Index (Lab-weighted)
  †  
(1.26) (1.30) (1.60)  (1.47) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.788 0.790 0.796  0.798 
Notes: Regressions include a lag of MA employment growth, the share of the population enrolled in college, the share of the 
population of working age, a constant, and BEA region dummies.  
  † Included in log form in regression. 
# N = 280. 
## N = 278. 
* significant at 10 percent. ** significant at 5 percent. *** significant at 1 percent.    
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Table 4: Second Inventor Regressions – Robust Standard Errors 
  1 2 3 4 
 
Patents 
per Capita †  
Patents 








nd Inventor†  
MA Employment Density, 1989†   0.217 
(2.43)**    0.262 
(1.90)*   
UA Employment Density, 1989†     0.264 
(2.59)**    0.486 
(3.36)*** 
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Adjusted R-squared  0.809 0.810 0.807 0.813 
Notes:  N = 280. Regressions include lagged industry employment shares, high-tech industry patent share, lagged 
patent class shares, the share of the population of working age, and BEA region dummies. 
  † Included in log form in regression.  




Table 5: Instrumental Variables Regressions – Robust Standard Errors 
  1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variable: Patents per Capita †   OLS IV OLS IV 
MA Employment Density, 1989†   0.228 
(2.58)**     
MA Employment Density, 1990-99 Avg.
 †     0.160 
(1.66)*    




MA Employment (10,000), 1989†   0.403 
(2.69)***    0.411 
(2.72)***   
MA Employment Squared, 1989†   -0.053 
(2.87)***    -0.056 
(3.02)***   
MA Employment (10,000), 1990-99 Avg.†     0.353 
(2.20)**    0.355 
(2.21)** 
MA Employment Squared, 1990-99 Avg.†     -0.047 
(2.42)**    -0.050 
(2.59)** 








































































Adjusted R-squared  0.791 0.791 0.788 0.788 
Notes:  N = 274. In addition to the independent variables used in Table 2, our instruments include temperature in 
January and July, days of sunlight in January, surface water in square miles and as a share of total area, 5 
dummy variables for topography, urbanized land area in 1980 (in logs) and its square, employment in 1970 
(in logs) and its square, the number of restaurants and museums in 1989 (in logs) and violent and property 
crime rates in 1989. The second stage regressions include lagged industry employment shares, high-tech 
industry patent share, patent class shares, the share of the population of working age, and BEA region 
dummies. 
  † Included in log form in regression.  
* significant at 10 percent. ** significant at 5 percent. *** significant at 1 percent.    
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Table 6: Spatial Dependence Tests
a (P-values) 
Density Measure:  MA Employment Density 
Specification:  Table 2.1  Table 2.2  Table 2.1  Table 2.2 
Test for:  Spatial Error  Spatial Lag 
Moran’s I  0 λ =   0.000 0.000     
LM -  0 λ =   0.350 0.401     
Robust LM- 0 λ =   0.788 0.749     
LM -  0 ρ =      0.156  0.254 
Robust LM- 0 ρ =      0.270  0.404 
Density Measure:  UA Employment Density 
Specification:  Table 2.3  Table 2.4  Table 2.3  Table 2.4 
Test for:  Spatial Error  Spatial Lag 
Moran’s I  0 λ =   0.000 0.000     
LM -  0 λ =   0.369 0.306     
Robust LM- 0 λ =   0.835 0.582     
LM -  0 ρ =      0.151  0.275 
Robust LM- 0 ρ =      0.255  0.504 
Notes: N  =  280. 
a Moran’s I is based on standardized z-values that follow a normal distribution. The Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) tests are distributed as 
2
1 χ  with critical levels of 3.84 (p = 0.05).  
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Table 7: Patent Intensity Regressions—Correcting for Spatial Effects 
(Robust Standard Errors) 
 1  2  3  4 
Dependent Variable: Patents per Capita†   Spatial Error  Spatial Lag 
MA Employment Density, 1989†   0.206 
(2.42)**    0.188 
(2.29)**   
UA Employment Density, 1990†     0.171 
(1.81)*    0.158 
(1.70)* 
































































Trade Secrets Index (Lab-weighted)
























Log Likelihood  -131.28  -132.85  -131.35  -132.66 
λ   .0342 
(1.02) 
.0259 
(0.78)    




Notes:  N = 280. Z statistic reported in parentheses. Regressions include lagged industry employment shares, high-
tech industry patent share, patent class shares, the share of the population of working age, and BEA region 
dummies. 
  † Included in log form in regression.  
* significant at 10 percent. ** significant at 5 percent. *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
 